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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
The Rights of the New Untouchables:
A Constitutional Analysis of
HIV Jurisprudence in India
Jayanth K. Krishnan*
There is a link that can be drawn between the levels of the HIV pandemic and the
protection of rights of vulnerable groups. The lesson is clear. Rights are a very important
part of... HIV prevention. They have to be part and parcel of the program of awareness
and sensitization.
-Anand Grover, Lawyer and HIV Activist1
ABSTRACT
It is believed that India will soon have the highest number of HIV/AIDS
cases of any country. Some reports project that 37 million people will be
infected within the next two decades. Sadly, few studies have examined the
legal claims of those who suffer with this disease in this, the world's largest
democracy. In this article, I systematically examine how the courts in India
have responded to rights-based claims brought by people who have HIV.
The conventional wisdom is that the Indian judiciary frequently protects
the rights of the poor, the under-represented, and the ill. But my findings
reveal that, at least for people with HIV, the courts have not extended to
this group full constitutional protection. The implications of this conclusion
force us to revisit whether the courts in India best safeguard the rights of
others who are disadvantaged.
* Jayanth K. Krishnan is Assistant Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul,
MN. J.D., Ohio State University; Ph.D. University of Wisconsin-Madison. For their com-
ments, I would like to thank Sonia Krishnan, Marc Galanter, Michael Jordan, and Gary
Jacobsohn. I am indebted to the University of Minnesota Law Library for providing me with
unfettered access to one of the best comparative constitutional law collections in the world.
Finally, I am grateful to all of the HIV/AIDS-activists who taught me about the importance of
their cause.
1. Anand Grover, A Tryst With Dominic, Speech presented at The National Human Rights
Conference On HIV/AIDS Ethics and the Law (24-25 Nov. 2000), available at http://
www.hri.ca/partners/Ic/unit/AGspeech.shtml.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The fourteenth international conference on AIDS concluded last year in
Barcelona to a swell of prominent headlines. From this meeting the world
learned of the latest developments in the fight against this devastating
disease. On the bright side, experts reported on promising new advances in
medical research and noted that in industrialized countries, people with
AIDS are gaining greater access to health care as well as acquiring more
political and legal recognition. But the optimism was clouded by a sobering
reality. Forty million people today are infected with HIV, the virus known to
cause AIDS.2 By 2020 an estimated seventy million people are projected to
die of AIDS.3 Over 90 percent of AIDS cases are in the developing world.'
In places like Africa and parts of Asia, poor economic conditions, a lack of
political will, social intolerance, and cultural barriers are just some of the
reasons why people with HIV fail to receive adequate medical care and are
denied basic political and legal rights.
One country poised on the brink of HIV implosion is India. Within the
next two decades, India will have the highest number of HIV cases in the
2. Sachchindanand Jha, $ IOBN Needed Annually to Fight AIDS: UN, TIMES OF INDIA, 8 July
2002. (HIV is short for human immunodeficiency virus, and AIDS is short for acquired
immune deficiency syndrome.)
3. United Nations, AIDS: Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic (2002), available at
httpV'/www.unaids.org/barcelona/presskit/embargo html .htm.
4. European Commission, Making an AIDS Vaccine Available in the Developing World,
(10 May 2000), available at http://www.iaen.org/papers/index.php?a=M. See also one of
the most informative websites on AIDS: http/www.unaids.org; Sachchindanand Jha,
94% AIDS Victims in Third World: WH.O., TIMES OF INDIA, 9 July 2002.
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world. According to one report the "United Nations estimates that if the
disease is not checked, a mind-boggling 37 million people in India could be
infected over the next 10 to 15 years."' Even with this staggering projection,
observers take solace in the belief that, at the very least, the political and
legal rights of the ill (including those with HIV) are safeguarded by a special
device incorporated within the judicial system. In India, any claimant may
file what is called a public interest litigation petition directly in the country's
Supreme Court when the state is charged with infringing upon a constitu-
tionally protected fundamental right.6 The terms "public interest litigation"
and "fundamental right" in the Indian context have particular meaning.
Fundamental rights resemble several of the same rights found in the United
States Constitution-including the right to equal protection. Public interest
litigation refers to the process of allowing, for example, an individual with
HIV to file a claim in the Supreme Court where there is an allegation of
state-based discrimination.7  Not surprisingly, many legal and political
scholars see public interest litigation as the touchstone of the Indian
democratic experience.8 Only the fiercest of democracies would provide
every individual direct access to the highest court in the land.
Yet does public interest litigation really serve the constitutional interests
of those with HIV in India? As stated, the conventional wisdom is that
historically disadvantaged groups, 9 including the ill, have frequently re-
ceived favorable judicial decisions from the public interest litigation
process. 10 This study questions this conventional wisdom by investigating
the constitutional rights currently being afforded to one set of castigated
5. Bates Gill & Sarah Palmer, The Coming AIDS Crisis in China, N.Y. TIMES, 16 July 2001,
at Al 5, available at httpV/www.brook.edu/views/op-ed/gill/20010716.htm (comparing
the rates of HIV in China with that of India).
6. For a classic treatment of the Indian Constitution, see GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN
CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A NATION (1966). For an updated study, see GRANVILLE AUSTIN,
WORKING A DEMOCRATIC ONSTITUTION: THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE (2000).
7. Courts have granted this power using Article 32 of the Constitution of India as
justification. There is an extended discussion of this provision in section two.
8. For a select set of readings, see J. Bhagwati, Judicial Activism and Public Interest
Litigation, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 561 (1985); Rajeev Dhavan, Law as Struggle: Public
Interest law in India, 36 J. INDIAN L. INST. 302 (1994) [hereinafter Dhavan, Law as
Struggle]; Carl Baar, Social Action Litigation in India: The Operations and Limitations on
the World's Most Active Judiciary, 19 POL'Y STUD. J. 140 (1990); Jamie Cassels, Judicial
Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible? 37 AM. J.
CoMe. L. 495 (1989).
9. The author uses the term "disadvantaged" throughout the study. By "disadvantaged,"
scholars who study India typically refer to those groups that have historically suffered
discrimination or who have had their rights severely curtailed. These would include:
lower castes, the poor, religious minorities, women, migrant laborers, those with
incurable diseases, and the like.
10. See, e.g, S.P. SATHE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA: TRANSGRESSING BORDERS AND ENFORCING LIMITS
(2001). For a more mixed set of results, see MARC GALANTER, COMPETING EQUALITIES (1984).
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minorities in India-arguably a group that needs judicial safeguarding the
most, people with HIV. My findings reveal that, although these individuals
are treated as the newest class of untouchables in Indian society," the courts
are unwilling to extend to them full protection under the constitution. 12 The
implications of this conclusion force us to revisit whether public interest
litigation has really advanced the constitutional claims of those who are
disadvantaged.
Section two of this article presents the position of those who promote
public interest litigation in India. This is followed by a summary of the few
existing empirical studies showing how the structure of both the judicial
system and the legal profession actually has inhibited public interest
litigation from flourishing, which has resulted in providing various disad-
vantaged groups with more modest gains than what is usually portrayed.
Section three discusses how the courts have treated people with HIV in
India. The evidence drawn upon involves an analysis of Supreme Court and
lower court cases. An examination looking at how constitutional legal
developments in other parts of the world (including the United States) have
seemingly influenced Indian judges in making their decisions is also
considered. Section four forecasts what the outlook is for those with HIV
seeking future protection from the courts. Because these individuals have
not yet received full equality through litigation, I contend that we may need
to reexamine whether turning to the judiciary is the most effective means of
protecting the rights of other disadvantaged groups as well.
II. MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
THROUGH PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
Perhaps the most unique feature of the Indian Constitution is Article 32. The
provisions of this Article state that:
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the
enforcement of rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs,
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo
11. See e.g., R. Devraj, India-AIDS: HIV Creates New Untouchables in India, INTER-PRESS NEWS
SERV., 8 July 1997, available at http/www.aegis.com/news/ips/1997/IP970704.html;
Amin Ahmed, The New Untouchables, REDIFF NEWS, 14 Mar. 2002, available at httpV/
www.rediff.com/news/2002/mar/1 6spec.htm.
12. One important study that looks at a related issue in Japan is: ERIC A. FELDMAN, THE RITUAL OF
RIGHTS IN JAPAN: LAW, SOCIETY AND HEALTH POLICY (2000) (noting that the legal mobilization of
rights-groups that focus on health policy, including HIV/AIDS, has occurred in Japan
despite the historical conception that citizens are less concerned with individual rights).
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warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of
any of the rights conferred by this Part.13
Over time, case law has come to interpret Article 32 as allowing for
ordinary citizens to petition the Supreme Court in matters where the central
government is accused of infringing upon the "fundamental rights" of the
constitution. 4 To facilitate the use of this right, the Court accepts epistle
petitions" s (letters that state a legal claim). This form of litigation has two
advantages-it is simple and inexpensive. There are also lenient standing
rules. Issues in front of the Court do not need to be "ripe," nor is there a
sense that the Court may involve itself in actual cases and controversies.16 In
addition, the constitution includes Article 226."' Courts have interpreted this
Article as giving any claimant the opportunity to file suit on behalf of the
public in a state supreme court, or High Court, when there is a state
violation of a fundamental right or a right guaranteed by statute.
It was only after Indira Gandhi lifted her Emergency Rule in 1977 that
lawyers began frequently using these two Articles to engage in public
interest litigation. 8 This type of lawyering promoted such issues as women's
rights, civil rights, civil liberties, environmental protection, and the rights of
lower castes. 19 During this time, the government also began funding legal
13. INDIA CONST. art. 32 (1950). For a discussion of this provision see Jayanth K. Krishnan &
Kevin den Dulk, So Help Me God, 30 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 233, 234 (2002). See also
CHARLES R. Epp, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 81-82 (1998). He notes that:
[TIhe Indian Supreme Court's jurisdiction is remarkably broad. It has original jurisdiction over
disputes between the national government and the states and between different states; it has
appellate jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases, . . and it has advisory jurisdiction to render
its opinion on any question of law or fact referred to it by the President. The court also has special
leave jurisdiction that grants it discretion to hear appeals involving "any judgment, decree,
determination, sentences or order in any cause or matter ... relating to the Armed Forces." Thus
the Supreme Court may decide nearly any issue that arises in Indian politics.
14. INDIA CONST. art. 12-35. They include such provisions as: the right to equality; right to
freedom of movement; right to freedom of speech and expression; the right to freedom of
religion, and the like. For relevant case law, see S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, A.I.R 1982
S.C. 149; D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 579; Ratlam Municipal
Council v. Vardhichand, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1622; Fertilizer Corporation v. Union of India,
A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 344; People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India A.I.R. 1982
S.C. 1473.
15. For a discussion of epistle petitions, see Baar, supra note 8.
16. Id.; Krishnan & den Dulk, supra note 13, at 233-34.
17. INDIA CONST. art. 226 (1950).
18. See generally Bhagwati, supra note 8; Dhavan, Law as Struggle, supra note 8; Baar, supra
note 8.
19. See generally Marc Galanter, New Patterns of Legal Services in India, in LAW AND SOCIETY
IN MODERN INDIA 279-95 (Rajeev Dhavan & Marc Galanter eds., 1989) [hereinafter,
Galanter, New Patterns]; Clark D. Cunningham, Public Interest Litigation in the Indian
Supreme Court: A Study in the Light of American Experience, 29 J. INDIAN L. INST. 494
(1987); G.L. Peiri, Public Interest Litigation in the Indian Subcontinent: Current
Dimensions, 40 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 66 (1991); S.P. SATHE, JUDICIAL AcTIVsM IN INDIA, supra
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aid programs that provided resources to public interest lawyers wishing to
serve the needs of the disadvantaged.20 This government support helped to
spark enthusiasm from private donors, both within and outside of India.
Soon there emerged several organizations that began championing legal
causes in court in a deliberate, systematic manner.21
The main goal of these lawyers was to transform the legal profession.
For too long Indian lawyers had been episodic generalists, by and large
operating independently from one another. Supporters of this new legal
rights movement wanted to see lawyers specialized, coordinated, and
structured. Lawyers with expertise could then advocate for the disadvan-
taged in a more strategic and purposive manner.22
But public interest lawyers during the 1980s were never fully successful
in achieving their desired results. 23 Procedural loopholes, of which there are
many within the Indian civil procedure code, prevented disputed questions
of fact from being resolved.24 Important court decisions were not executed
and only on occasion were judgments monitored. Research that tracked two
significant Supreme Court rulings during this era25 (one that required
workers to receive a minimum wage and the other that barred forced
note 10; S.P. Sathe, Political Activism (//): Post-Emergency Judicial Activism: Liberty and
Good Governance, 10 INDIAN SCHOOL OF POL. ECON. 603 (1998); Susan D. Susman, Distant
Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest Litigation, 13
WIS. INT'L L. J. 58 (1994), Madhava Menon, Justice Sans Lawyers: Some Indian
Experiments, 12 INDIAN BAR REV. 444 (1985).
20. For studies that show how the implementation of legal aid before the Emergency was
desultory, see generally Oliver Koppel 1, The Indian Lawyer as Social Innovator: Legal Aid
in India, 3 L. & Soc'Y REV. 299 (1969). Among the many "populist" amendments to the
Constitution enacted during the Emergency was a new Directive Principle decreeing
"equal justice and free legal aid." See, e.g., INDIA CONST. 39A (1950). "The State shall
secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on a basis of equal
opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or
schemes or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not
denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities." Inserted by the
Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1976 sec. 8. The Committee on Implemen-
tation of Legal Aid Schemes (CILAS) was established in 1980 by the Government of India
with Supreme Court Justice (as he was then), P.C. Bhagwati as Chair of Budget Activities.
21. See, e.g., Galanter, New Patterns, supra note 19, at 279-95; Epp, supra note 13, at 97;
D.L. Sheth & Harsh Sethi, The NGO Sector in India: Historical Context and Current
Discourse, 2 VOLUNTAS 49 (1991), available at httpV/fnf-southasia.com/cerc.htm.
22. Id.
23. Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, Debased Informalism: Lok Adalats and Legal
Rights in India, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW
(Thomas Heller & Erik Jensen eds., forthcoming 2003); see generally S.K. AGARWAL, PUBLIC
INTEREST LITIGATION IN INDIA: A CRITIQUE (1985).
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, A.I.R 1982 S.C. 1473;
Bandhua Morcha v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802.
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labor 6) found that little changed as a result of these decisions.27 Most
lawyers continued to work as generalists who did not specialize. These
lawyers were eventually unable to follow through with commitments to
their cause or commitments to the groups they represented.28
The energy that sparked the public interest litigation movement during
the 1980s tapered off. The once excited initiators of public interest
lawyering began turning their attention to other ideas, including institution-
alizing alternative dispute forums. The hope was that rather than dealing
with the formal, adversarial court system, those most in need might fare
better through a more conciliatory, informal process. As for using litigation
to promote policy objectives, today public interest lawyering in India has
returned to its old-fashion ad hoc character, whereby atomistic lawyers turn
to the courts if and when they are able to afford it. However, one
organization that represents people with HIV has attempted regularly to use
the courts to advocate its cause. This group is known as the Lawyers
Collective. The next section examines the recent string of HIV court cases-
many of which have been brought by lawyers from this group-and
evaluates the judiciary's response to such public interest litigation.
26. In the first case the Supreme Court upheld the Payment of Minimum Wage Act and
further stated that any employer found guilty of not paying workers the minimum wage
was in violation of Article 23 of the Constitution. Article 23, Constitution of India states
that "traffic in human beings and beggars and other similar forms of forced labour are
prohibited and any contraventions of this provision shall be an offence punishable in
accordance with the law." A similar result occurred in the second case. This matter was
brought by a lawyer-swami working with oppressed "Bonded Labourers" in the
Fardiabad quarries near Delhi. The petitioners in this case sought to enforce the
provisions of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act of 1976, which was a piece of
Emergency legislation that statutorily codified the Constitutional prohibition against
forced labor.
27. See Oliver Mendelsohn, Life and Struggle in the Stone Quarries of India: A Case-Study,
29 J. COMMONWEALTH & COMP. POL. 43, 69 n.3 (1991) [hereinafter, Mendelsohn, Life and
Struggle] (especially noting in the second case that although the Supreme Court's
decision was "pronounced in the language of outraged morality" that the judgment itself
had little impact on the actual petitioners' cause given the fact that it was handed down
well after the worker's project was completed). See also a public interest law website,
www.healthlibrary.com/reading/banyan2/9opresed.com (noting that the employers of
these workers "quietly reverted to paying the workers paltry wages, less than the
minimum, in total disregard of the Supreme Court ruling." This is a quotation from a
public interest law website that tracks social action litigation in India). See ARUN SHOURIE,
COURTS AND THEIR JUDGEMENTS 16-58 (2001). See also AGARWAL, supra note 23, at 10-13
(identifying several Supreme Court judges who have expressed "a not-too-friendly
posture to PIL [public interest litigation]").
28. See Epp, supra note 13, at 97-98; Galanter, New Patterns, supra note 19, at 279-82;
Smitu Kothari, The Human Rights Movement in India: A Critical Overview, in RETHINKING
HUMAN RIGHTS: CHALLENGES FOR THEORY AND AcTION (Smitu Kothari & Harsh Sethi eds., 1991).
2003
HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
III. HIV JURISPRUDENCE FROM THE INDIAN JUDICIARY
A. The Dominic D'Souza Case
Among the first HIV cases heard by the Indian courts occurred over ten
years ago. The case involved the famous HIV/AIDS activist, Dominic
D'Souza. D'Souza was an employee at the World Wildlife Federation when,
in 1986, he learned that he had HIV.29 Fired from his job and refused
treatment by medical doctors, D'Souza was soon incarcerated in a sani-
tarium in his home state of Goa.30 State officials justified their action as
serving the public interest and cited Section 53 of the 1987 Goa Public
Health (Amendment) Act, which mandated that individuals who tested
positive for HIV/AIDS be placed in isolation. 1 After sixty-four days in
detention a court released D'Souza, not on the basis of any illegality of the
statute, but rather because the blood test given to D'Souza was deemed
unreliable.3 2
In 1989, Section 53 was amended and the "mandatory requirement of
isolation of an AIDS patient . . . was converted into the discretionary
requirement and authority of the [state's] Health Officer."3 3 With the help of
the Lawyers Collective, Lucy D'Souza, Dominic's mother, initiated an
Article 226 lawsuit to declare Section 53 unconstitutional.3 4 Anand Grover
and G.V. Tamba, the lawyers for D'Souza, argued to the Bombay High Court
that Section 53 violated the constitution's equal protection clause, as well
as the right to move freely around the country,36 and the right to enjoy
personal liberty.17 They also claimed that Section 53 was not grounded in
scientific fact, that the statute was arbitrary and capricious, and that it
denied procedural due process by not allowing those detained to have a
hearing. 8 Point-by-point, the Bombay High Court rejected each of these
arguments.
29. For background on how D'Souza was fired, see Ashok Row Kavi & Dinyar Godrej, Bigots
Take the Temple, 250 NEW INTERNATIONALIST (1993), available at http/www.newint.org/
issue250/bigots.htm.
30. See Julie Hamblin, People Living with HIV: The Law, Ethics and Discrimination, Issues
Paper No. 4, United Nations Development Programme (Nov. 1992) (on file with author),
available at http/www.undp.org/hiv/publications/issues/english/issueO4e.htm.
31. While the background information for this case is mentioned in Hamblin's paper (cited
above), it is not discussed in the case itself. However, the statute is discussed in the case,
D'Souza v. State of Goa, A.I.R. 1990 BOM 355, 356.
32. See Hamblin, supra note 30.
33. D'Souza v. State of Goa, A.I.R. 1990 BOM 356.
34. Note, while Goa is its own state, the Bombay High Court, which is located in the state
of Maharashtra, has jurisdiction over Goa.
35. INDIA CONST. art. 14. (1950).
36. Id. art. 19(1)(d).
37. Id. art. 21.
38. D'Souza v. State of Goa, A.I.R. 1990 BOM 357.
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The court first noted that the state could isolate someone with HIV/
AIDS. 39 In fact, as the court stated "it may also be in the interest of an AIDS
patient, because he may become desperate and lose all hopes of survival
and therefore, has to be saved against himself." 40 Unfortunately, the court
failed to offer data supporting its conclusion. It provided two reports, one
from Brown University and the other from the Government of India, to
justify its view. But upon a closer reading, neither of these studies endorsed
the position the court adopted.41 Furthermore, the court in a very deprecat-
ing manner claimed that it was "too ill-equipped to doubt the correctness of
the Legislative wisdom." 42 Again nowhere does the court's decision cite
evidence that the Legislature conducted investigations, held hearings, or
gathered testimony from experts in the field before passing this law.
The court then addressed whether Section 53 was arbitrary. Instead of
dealing with this contention, the court disregarded the arguments made by
the petitioning attorneys. Reciting the various provisions of the statute, the
court without explanation found no "ground for invalidating the source of
the [state's] power" 43 to detain.
The conclusion of the court's opinion dealt with whether a hearing was
required before incarcerating an HIV/AIDS patient. The court said no;
Section 53 was "not procedurally unjust despite absence of pre-decisional
right of hearings ."44 So long as a hearing is offered at some point-whether
it is before or after a decision on detention has been made-Section 53 will
be constitutional. The court also added in its conclusion that because it
accepted the case under its Article 226 authority, it could not issue damages
for wrongful isolation.4s But this line of reasoning runs contrary to a 1983
Supreme Court of India case which stated that the judiciary's ability to
protect the fundamental rights of a person would "be denuded of its
significant content if the power ... were limited to passing orders of release
from illegal detention." 46
Some observers contend that the D'Souza case, while far from a
39. Id. at 358-59.
40. Id. at 358.
41. Id. The Brown study the court cites, Managing AIDS Patients: The Health Care
Professionals Survival Guide, discusses the isolation of AIDS patients as an option only
in a very limited number of cases, such as when d patient has infectious diarrhea or
infectious tuberculosis. Regarding the government of India study that the court cites,
there is only mention of surveillance, not the quarantining or isolation of an AIDS
patient.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 360.
44. Id. at 361.
45. Id.
46. Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 1086, 1089.
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complete victory, nevertheless provided partial gains to people with HIV.47
After all, the mandatory detention principle of Section 53 was changed to a
more discretionary system following Dominic D'Souza's court-ordered
release from confinement. Moreover, the court did require that people with
HIV who were detained be given a hearing at some point in the process.
Regarding the first point, it is true that the language of Section 53 was
changed after D'Souza's release, but recall that the judge there issued no
objection to the mandatory provision within the law and instead let
D'Souza free on an unrelated issue. And it was the legislature, not any court,
that changed Section 53 in 1989.
In terms of the second point, what is missing from the Bombay High
Court opinion is a timeframe in which a detainee is to be provided with a
hearing. How long can a person with HIV be held before being heard?
Given the nature of this illness, time is of the essence. Also, just three years
prior to the D'Souza case, the Supreme Court of India ruled that every
individual who is ill and who seeks assistance from a government physician
has a constitutional right to receive medical treatment.4 8 Yet no mention of
this principle is cited by the Bombay High Court. Perhaps most troubling
about the decision is that a true parsing of the court's language indicates that
much of its ruling was based on conjecture, speculation, and very little
evidence or data. This reluctance to provide equal protection to people with
HIV, as we shall see, has had serious implications for others seeking to
exercise their fundamental rights under the constitution.
B. Beyond the D'Souza Decision: A String of Mixed Results
One of the immense difficulties in studying Indian constitutional law is that
centralized databases that claim to provide a comprehensive list of court
decisions often are incomplete. In addition, Indian courts routinely issue
what are called interim orders. These are temporary judgments, dealing
with specific aspects of a case, which can become permanent if there is no
47. Mitu Varma, India Health: Legal Luminaries Seek AIDS Legislation, INTER-PRESS NEWS SERV.,
21 Oct. 1997, available at http//www.aegis.com/news/ips/1997/IP971005.html. The
Lawyers Collective, the organization that represented D'Souza sees this case still as an
important decision. For the group's views on this case, see Notable Cases, The Lawyers
Collective, available at http'/www.hri.ca/partnersAc/about/cases.shtmi.
48. Vincent Parikulangara v. Union of India A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 990 (noting that public medical
facilities must, in emergency and non-emergency situations provide health-care for those
seeking assistance); see also Parmanand Katara v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 2039(1989) (noting that private centers may only refuse to treat when it is a non-emergency
situation). This latter case raises an important issue because the majority of people in
India turn to private centers. The question is whether having HIV is considered to be an
emergency, since one can possess this virus but remain asymptomatic.
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appeal. Interim orders are occasionally written, but frequently are delivered
orally. Even when they are written, interim orders typically are only
provided to the parties. The presence of these interim orders, along with the
20,000 cases still pending at the Supreme Court level and the millions of
matters unresolved in the state High Courts,49 make it impossible for any
institutional body to compile a full record of cases given the country's lack
of resources.
Not surprisingly, judges sometimes neglect precedent when making
decisions. Most judges do not have full-time clerks and must depend on the
lawyers to provide them with relevant case law. In his landmark study of
Indian affirmative action rulings, Marc Galanter found different three-judge
panels of the Supreme Court failing to take into account precedent-setting
judgments.5 0 Another issue is that editors of case reporting companies use
their discretion in selecting which cases to include in their volumes. Thus,
those who study Indian constitutional law and wish to have a complete list
of cases, are forced to rely on a variety of sources, including media accounts
and information from a range of legal observers, as well as these incomplete
case reporters. Fortunately after spending a year collecting materials and
rulings on HIV legal matters, I have been able to compile what is so far the
most comprehensive list of cases on the subject of HIV.
Following the D'Souza case a number of legal developments occurred
that resulted in great public confusion. For example, some years after
handing down its decision in D'Souza, the Bombay High Court ordered the
mass arrest of hundreds of female sex workers."1 In an unpublished ruling
the court cited public health reasons, particularly the fear of the mass spread
of AIDS, as justification for its decision to "rescue" these women and girls. 2
However, various human rights accounts note that many of the arrested
were incarcerated, forced to undergo testing for sexually transmitted
diseases, including HIV/AIDS, and brutalized by the authorities that housed
them. 3 Those who tested positively for HIV/AIDS were either deported back
to their villages (where they endured the hostility of shaming by their
49. See Bibek Debroy, Losing a World Record, FAR EAST. ECON. REV., 14 Feb. 2002, at 23
(noting that there are "23 million pending court cases-20,000 in the Supreme Court, 3.2
million in the High Courts and 20 million in lower or subordinate courts").
50. See generally GALANTER, COMPETING EQUALITIES, supra note 10.
51. See Yoshie Furuhashi, "Rescuing" Sex Workers, in COMPENDIUM ON CHILD PROSTITUTION
(compiled by Socio-Legal Information Centre, 2000), available athttp*'/csf.colorado.edu/
soc/m-fem/2000/msgOl 408.html.
52. As stated, this is one of the cases that is unreported and unpublished. Interview with Mr.
Vivek Diwan, Coordinator of the Lawyers Collective HIV/AIDS Unit (2 July 2002). See id.
53. See Usha Rai, Sex Workers Narrate Harrowing Tales of Atrocities Inflicted by Guardians
of Law, in COMPENDIUM ON CHILD PROSTITUTION (compiled by Socio-Legal Information Centre,
2000), available at http//csf.colorado.edu/soc/m-fem/2000/msgOl 408.html.
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community), or were left to die in detention centers.5 4 Most shocking was a
report from one observer who obtained this unpublished order, in which the
court directed "that the raids be a regular feature" ss of public policy until the
spread of HIV/AIDS in the state decreased.
By contrast, around the same time that the Bombay Court declared this
order, the Supreme Court of India issued an important public policy ruling
affecting the storage of blood in the country. The case arose as a result of the
public interest organization, Common Cause, filing an Article 32 petition in
the Supreme Court.16 Outraged at the inadequate maintenance of blood,
Common Cause asked the Court to require an overhaul in the country's
blood system.17 To support its claim, the group cited the existence of
unhygienic storage facilities, the lack of trained professionals at these blood
centers, and the fact that "85 per cent of blood collected in the country is
not screened for AIDS."58
Recognizing the immediate crisis occurring within the Indian blood
banks, the Court ordered governments at the central and state level, as well
as the National AIDS Control Organization, the main public institution
handling HIV/AIDS policy, to implement a series of changes. These
included establishing councils at the national and state levels devoted to
monitoring and ensuring sanitary blood transfusion services.5 9 The Court
also held that all blood banks must be licensed, and that there must be
intensive screening of blood donations.60 As the Court noted: "The blood
trade flourishes with poor people ... The blood banks presently thrive on
bleeding 4000-5000 professional donors in 18-20 cities. The professional
blood donors, which include many, are reported to be victims of ill health,
low hemoglobin, and many infections .. .."61
To end this professionalization, the Court directed the councils only to
accept voluntary donations. (According to a recent report, this ruling is now
54. Id.; see also Rescued Minor Sex Workers Demand Release, TIMES OF INDIA, 14 Feb. 1996;
23 Prostitutes Escape Through a Hole in Wall, INDIAN EXPRESS, 3 July 1996; Meena Menon,
Rehabilitation for Child Sex Workers: In the Red, 4 HUMANSCAPE, Jan. 1997, available at
http/www.indiawatch.org.in/ezines/humanscape/cont-j97.htm.
55. See Furuhashi, supra note 51.
56. Common Cause v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 929.
57. Id. at 929-30.
58. Id. at 930.
59. Id. at 933.
60. Id. at 932-36.
61. Id. at 930 (citing the report of MWs A.F. Ferguson & Co.). Although curiously the Court
notes that while poverty makes these donors give blood, it is not the only reason. There
is a physical "high" that a donor receives; "the blood seller enjoy[s] the dizziness due to
a reduced supply." But why the Court makes such a statement or where it obtains its
evidence is unclear.
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being followed throughout the country.)62 The Court also made reference to
the fact that the medical welfare of all citizens (those with good health, HIV,
or otherwise) depends upon a system that is legitimate and refrains from
exploiting those weakest in society. In the immediate aftermath of this
decision, as shown in the next section, other courts in different HIV-related
cases began to show similar concern. But this progress abruptly ended with
a seminal ruling handed down by none other than the Supreme Court just
three years later.
C. A Sign of Real Hope-The MX Case, 1997
A year after the Supreme Court's judgment in Common Cause, the Bombay
High Court made a historic ruling in a labor law case that gave important
protection to people with HIV. MX of Bombay v. MAls ZY63 involved a casual
laborer who sought employment on a full-time basis from the company for
which he worked. 64 In 1990 the company told the casual laborer that he
was on a list of finalists for full-time employment. First, though, the laborer
needed to pass a medical exam, which he successfully completed.61 While
the laborer "was not [immediately] appointed in a regular vacancy, he was
included in the select list of persons to be appointed on a regular basis." 66 In
1993 the company again requested that he seek another medical examina-
tion; after this visit the doctors detected that the laborer positively tested for
HIV. Upon learning of these results, the company removed the casual
laborer from full-time consideration and from his present position, even
though he was asymptomatic and, according to doctors, unlikely to show
signs of illness for years.67
62. The National AIDS Control Organization (NACO) released a report detailing all the
changes that have been made since the Common Cause ruling. Although the selling of
body parts has been widely publicized in India, no mention is made of this in the report
by NACO. See Combating HIV/AIDS in India 2000-2001, NACO, available at httpV/
www.naco.nic.in. One group that has rejected the Common Cause ruling is the Joint
Action Council Kannur (JACK). This group is quite controversial in nature and its views
have been compared to that of Thabo Mbeki, the current president of South Africa. JACK
has questioned the manner in which the mainstream medical community has addressed
the AIDS crisis, and the group has also been skeptical of the majority of findings that
report that HIV causes AIDS. JACK is a supporter of the private selling of blood and
opposes most of the Indian government's AIDS policies because of the involvement of
institutions, such as the World Bank, that it believes has corrupted state leaders. See
literature published by JACK on file with author.
63. A.I.R. 1997 BOM 406.
64. Id. at 408.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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The laborer unsuccessfully pleaded with the company to reconsider,
noting that he was the main breadwinner in his otherwise impoverished
family. He then filed a complaint with the state health services director.
Using Article 226 of the Indian Constitution, he subsequently brought a
public interest suit in the Bombay High Court charging that the company
had violated both his fundamental right to earn a living68 and the equal
protection article of the Indian constitution.69 In a detailed and thoughtful
opinion, the Bombay Court's MX decision greatly advanced the rights of
people with HIV in employment law matters.
The court combed through an extensive array of literature on HIV/AIDS,
including reports from the World Health Organization and medical evi-
dence from India and abroad. It also referred to two American cases, School
Board of Nassau County Florida v. Arline and Chalk v. U.S. District Court
Central District of California.70 In Arline, a schoolteacher who was fired
because of previous bouts with tuberculosis sued seeking protection under
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.71 The case reached the US Supreme Court
where it was held that a federally funded state institution could not
discriminate against an individual solely on the basis of one's "handicap." 72
In Chalk, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a kindergarten
teacher with, AIDS could not be removed from his position simply because
of his medical condition.73
Relying in part on these decisions, the Bombay High Court concluded
"in the vast majority of occupations and occupational settings, work does
not involve a risk of acquiring or transmitting HIV between workers, from
worker to client, or from client to worker."74 So long as an individual's HIV
status does not interfere with job performance, an employer may not deem
an applicant or present employee unfit for the position s.7 For employers to
68. INDIA CONST. art. 21 is cited as the basis for this claim, even though the language of Article
21 does not explicitly provide this right. Article 21 states, "No person shall be deprived
of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law." However,
in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corp., A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 180, the Supreme Court
expanded Article 21 to cover the right to earn a living.
69. INDIA CONST. art. 14.
70. 480 U.S. 273 (1987); 840 F. 2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
71. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
72. Id. at 281-86 (the Court here held that having tuberculosis qualified as a handicap and
remanded the case to district court for a determination of appropriate findings of fact
based on medical expertise).
73. 840 F. 2d 701 (1988).
74. Mr. MX of Bombay v. M/s ZY A.I.R. 1997 BOM at 410.
75. In Anand Bihari v. Rajasthan S.R.T.C, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1003, the Supreme Court ruled
that where an employee is deemed to be in ill-health, an employer may have the
discretion to fire that employee, if the "ill-health" is adversely affecting job performance.
Here, though, the Court distinguishes that case from the present one, as MX was deemed
to be medically-fit. So even though MX had an incurable disease, the Court did not find
him to be in "ill-health."
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discriminate solely because someone has HIV "is clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable and infringes the wholesome requirement of Article 14 [the
equal protection clause] as well as Article 21 [the right to earn a living]." 76
The court also held: that the state is in charge of providing opportunities for
people to work; 77 that the right to work is critical to the right to life;78 and
that the right to social and economic justice is a fundamental right. 9
The court ordered that the company reinstate the casual laborer to his
original position and allow him to reapply for full-time employment. 0 It
directed the company to pay 40,000 rupees in damages to the laborer for
the time he was out of work.81 Further the court ruled that future petitioners,
like this claimant, would be allowed to sue under a pseudonym in order to
protect their privacy.8 2 (In reaching this specific part of its decision, the court
drew upon comparative constitutional law, particularly citing a ruling from
a New South Wales court that permitted a case to proceed without revealing
the plaintiff's identity.)8" Given this decision, one might think that the
response from HIV activists would be overwhelmingly supportive. Yet there
was a more measured reaction from the organization that represented the
petitioner in this case. Consider the following statement revealed in a memo
from the Lawyers Collective:
Lessons Learned [from the MX decision]
* It is possible to use courts to advance the rights of persons living with HIV/
AIDS (italics added).
" It is sometimes possible to go to court to fight for one's rights without having
one's HIV status revealed publicly.
" The judiciary needs to be educated about HIV/AIDS.
" The fact that another set of judges might have decided the case quite
differently highlights the need for specific legislation to protect the rights of
persons living with HIV/AIDS.8 4
76. Mr. MX of Bombay v. M/s ZY A.I.R. 1997 BOM at 430. For a discussion of how Article
21 has expanded, see supra note 68.
77. Id. at 429; see also Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802, 3 SCC
161.
78. Mr. MX of Bombay v. M/s ZY A.I.R. 1997 BOM at 429; see also Olga Tellis v. Bombay
Municipal Corp., A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 180.
79. Mr. MX of Bombay v. Ws ZY A.I.R. 1997 BOM at 429; see also C.E.S.C. Ltd & Others v.
Subhash Chandra Bose & Others A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 573.
80. Mr. MX of Bombay v. M/s ZY A.I.R. 1997 BOM 432.
81. This amount is the equivalent today to about $750, but in terms of rupees it is not an
insignificant sum.
82. Mr. MX of Bombay v. Ms ZY A.I.R. 1997 BOM 432, 414-15.
83. The New South Wales case was entitled, DM v. TD, 1 MLR 80 (1994).
84. Memorandum from Anand Grover and Mandeep Dhaliwal, The Lawyers Collective,
Court in India Reverses Workplace Discrimination. The Lawyers Collective was the
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Although this cautious optimism would prove to be clairvoyant in the years
to come, following this decision others began to use public interest litigation
to advance the rights of people with HIV. The nongovernmental organiza-
tion, Sahara, which provides funding to hospices that care for sufferers of
HIV/AIDS, sued a government hospital for refusing to treat a patient with
HIV. s In another case, Sahara filed an action against National AIDS Control
Organization (NACO), the government body in charge of AIDS policy, for
not fulfilling its mission to fight this deadly virus aggressively.86 Also, the
controversial organization Joint Action Council Kannur (JACK), a group that
rejects conventional studies, tests, and medical opinions on HIV/AIDS, went
to court on behalf of a village that was ostracized by the government,
media, and private businesses after one resident died of the disease.7
While these cases remain under review, there were rulings that
provided even more hope to those with HIV. In the northeastern state of
Assam, the High Court ordered government agencies working on AIDS to
act with more transparency and accountability to the public.88 The High
Court in the southern state of Kerala directed NACO to release its work and
findings on AIDS to the public. 89 An interim order by the High Court in the
state of West Bengal led to the Indian Navy compensating a family for a
blood transfusion performed in a military hospital that resulted in the wife of
a naval officer contracting AIDS.90
To what extent the MX decision led to the filing of more cases or
influenced these other judgments are open questions. But we have evidence
that for the next two years the rulings from the Indian judiciary began to
organization that represented the petitioner in this case. Anand Grover was the attorney
in charge of the case and Mandeep Dhaliwal was the Project Coordinator of the HIV/
AIDS Unit. (Memo on file with author.)
85. There is no formal citation to these suits that are pending, but for a brief discussion of the
SAHARA matter see Human Rights and Health Matter Most When They are Most at Risk,
The Lawyers Collective, available at http/www.hri.ca/partners/Ic/unit/dialogue3.shtml.
86. See Dev Raj, Health-India: World Bank Funds Fail People with HIV/AIDS, INTER-PRESS
SERV., 1 Dec. 1998, available at http/www.aegis.com/news/ips/1998/IP981201 .html.
87. See S.P. SINHA, INDIA SITS ON AIDS BOMB (1999); see also id.; Dev Raj, Health-India: Election
Fever Bypasses "HIV Village," INTER-PRESS ERV.,1 Mar. 1998, available at httpv/www.
aegis.com/news/ips/1998/IP981201 .html.; Anju Singh, Making Waves Changing Tides;
The Story of the Join Action Council Kannur (JACK), India, 6 CONTINUUM (Summer/Autumn
2001).
88. This case is not published or reported. Author Correspondence with advocates from The
Lawyers Collective, 2 July 2002 (on file with author). For a brief discussion of the court
ruling, see Grover, supra note 1, at 4.
89. This case was brought by the Joint Action Council Kannur. For Information on this non-
published order see Studies, Projects, Campaigns, Pubilcations, Joint Action Council
Kannur, available at http/www.eionews.addr.com/ack/jacktivity.htm. See also, Singh,
supra note 87.
90. For information on this non-published order, see Notable Cases, The Lawyers Collective,
available at httpV/www.hri.ca/partners/Ic/about/cases.shtmI.
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advance the rights of individuals afflicted with HIV. In a comparative
context, the MX case was important for the South African Supreme Court,
which, following the principles of the Bombay High Court, ruled that having
HIV alone does not disqualify an individual from applying for a position as
a flight attendant. 91 However, to many observers the advances made in MX
came to a screeching halt in 1999 with the Supreme Court's judgment in Mr.
X v. Hospital Z. As a feature editorial in a moderately conservative
newspaper stated, not only was the Hospital Z decision "disturbing" but it
contributed to a "distorting of the reality of AIDS . . . [and was] grossly
unjust." 92
D. Mr. X v. Hospital Z, 1999: A Significant Step Backward
The Mr. X v. Hospital Z case emerged with a series of events that began in
1995. Doctors in the eastern state of Nagaland recommended to a patient
(who was the uncle of a state-level minister) that he travel to the southern
city of Madras for a surgical operation.93 A local doctor, referred to in the
case as Mr. X, accompanied the patient on his journey to Madras.94 Just prior
to the operation, the doctors in Madras asked Mr. X to donate blood in case
they needed it during the operation. 9s Mr. X complied, but his blood was not
used; the patient was discharged and he and Mr. X returned to their home
state.
A couple of months later Mr. X proposed to a Ms. Y and a wedding date
Was scheduled for December of 1995. However, sometime before the
wedding the Nagaland state minister received a call from the hospital
informing him that Mr. X was HIV positive.96 Soon Mr. X's family, friends,
and neighbors became aware of his condition; the wedding was cancelled
and he was ostracized from his community.97 Mr. X left Nagaland and took
a medical position, coincidentally, in the city of Madras.98
91. Hoffmann v. South African Airways, 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC).
92. Kalpana Kannabiran, The Right to Life, THE HINDU, 21 Oct 2001, available at httpv/www.
hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2001/10/21/stories/1 321061 a.htm.
93. Mr. X v. Hospital Z, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 495, 498. Actually the identity of the patient was
Itokhu Yepthomi. The case makes no mention of this individual being the uncle of a
state-minister. However in subsequent articles by the attorney for the petitioner, Anand
Grover, the connection between the patient and the minister is established.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Note the case is silent as to this fact, but again the lawyer involved in the proceeding
writes of this in: Anand Grover, HIV/AIDS Persons' Right to Marry Suspended, The
Lawyers Collective, availalble at httpV/www.hri.ca/partners/Ic/unit/SCJUDGART.shtml
[hereinafter Grover, Right to Marry].
97. Mr. X v. Hospital Z, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 498.
98. Id.
2003
HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
Mr. X subsequently filed a complaint in the National Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, arguing that the hospital breached its duty
of confidentiality when it released the information of his blood donation to
a third party.99 The Commission dismissed the petition and instructed Mr. X
to litigate this matter in civil court if he wished to seek a remedy.100 Mr. X
then appealed this dismissal to the Indian Supreme Court. The main issue
confronting the Court was whether the Commission correctly dismissed the
complaint.
In an unusual move, the Court used this case to address a range of
issues that Mr. X did not raise on appeal. First, rather than construing
whether the Commission justifiably dismissed the original complaint, the
Court began its analysis by discussing the issue of confidentiality.101 The
Court acknowledged the sanctity that confidentiality is given in both the
Hippocratic Oath and in the Indian Code of Medical Ethics. But the Court
noted that the doctor-patient privilege allowed for exceptions when the
"public interest would override the duty of confidentiality, particularly
where there is an immediate or future health risk to others." 0 2 Using this
rationale the Court reasoned that:
[T]he proposed marriage carried with it the health risk to an identifiable person
who had to be protected from being infected with the communicable disease
from which the appellant suffered. The right to confidentiality, if any, vested in
the appellant was not enforceable in the present situation.10 3
Second, the Court disregarded the notion that Mr. X's privacy rights
were violated by the disclosure of his HIV status. Citing several Indian, as
well as American, cases, the Court stated that while the right of privacy is
guaranteed in the constitution of India and that the fundamental rights of the
constitution have "penumbral zones," limits may be placed on these rights
so long as there is a compelling state interest. 0 4 Making direct reference to
Roe v. Wade and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
the Court held that exceptions to the right of privacy were allowed when the
"health or morals or... rights and freedom of others" 05 were at stake. On
99. Id.
100. Grover, Right to Marry, supra note 96 (noting that the hospital denied ever leaking the
matter).
101. Mr. X v. Hospital Z, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 499-500.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 500.
104. Id. at 500-501. The Indian cases the Court cites include: Govind v. State of Madhya
Pradesh, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1378; Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1295;
Malak Singh, State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 760; R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu,
A.I.R. 1994 SCW 4420. The American cases that the Court cites include Wolf v.
Colorado 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
105. Mr. X v. Hospital Z, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 501.
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this basis the Court found that no fault lay with the hospital for divulging Mr.
X's status. The fiancee had a greater interest in knowing about her potential
husband's medical condition than any individual claim of privacy he may
make.
Third, the Court then curiously decided to discuss how the presence of
a venereal disease by either the husband or wife can serve as the basis for
divorce in India. In India, there currently is a system where certain family
law matters of Hindus, Muslims, Parsees, and Christians are governed by the
respective religious laws.'0 6 These matters include marriage, divorce,
succession, and adoption. 10 7 (The administration of these personal laws in
India is in the hands of state judges.) 10 8 The Court outlined how each of the
religious laws allows for divorce when one party has a venereal disease.10 9
But without explanation the Court declared that where "the law provides
the 'venereal disease' as a ground for divorce ... such a person who was
suffering from that disease, even prior to the marriage cannot be said to
have any right to marry so long as he is not fully cured . . .,,0
The Court went on to say that because Indian penal law sets forth
criminal sanctions against those who knowingly spread an infection to
another, a duty is created upon people like Mr. X "not to marry.""' And
perhaps most confounding were the Court's concluding remarks which
stated that: "'AIDS' is the product of indisciplined sexual impulse. The
impulse, being the notorious human failing if not disciplined, can afflict and
overtake anyone how high soever, or for that matter how low he may be in
the social strata."" 12
Within the HIV community, the decision by the Supreme Court came as
a shock. Rather than offering a careful analysis of the case at hand, the Court
used the situation to make a public policy decision that went well beyond
its reach. Why the Court decided to expand its ruling so extensively is
unclear. The question before the Court was very narrow, namely whether
the Commission below had properly dismissed Mr. X's complaint against
the hospital for revealing his HIV status to a third party. The petition never
raised issues such as the right to divorce or the right to marry. " 3
Furthermore, the Court's characterization of AIDS as an "indisciplined
106. See Marc Galanter & Jayanth Krishnan, Personal Law and Human Rights in India and
Israel, 34 ISR. L. REV. 101, 109 (2000) (discussing personal law in India).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Mr. X v. Hospital Z, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 502.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 503.
112. Id.
113. See Grover, Right to Marry, supra note 96.
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sexual impulse" ignored the complexity of the illness.14 While sexual
intercourse is one way of transmitting the disease, there are other ways. As
discussed, transmission can occur through tainted blood transfusions as
well as through intravenous drug use. Also, the Court failed to grasp that
simply because an individual has HIV does not necessarily mean she will
exhibit signs of full-blown AIDS. The level of illness associated with HIV
varies, and individuals who have the virus may be asymptomatic for
years." For the highest court in the world's largest democracy to make such
sweeping, ill-informed statements was at best insensitive and at worst a
major disservice to the public.
The Court also trampled over the nuances inherent in the question of
who has the right to marry. International law recognizes that the right to
marry is a natural right guaranteed to every individual of full age. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights both have provisions adopting this principle."6 Yet
the Court in this case, with one fell swoop, held that people with HIV do not
have a right to marry. The Court's stated worry was that a healthy spouse
may acquire the disease from her infected husband who has failed to
disclose his illness; thus, there was a public policy interest in protecting the
innocent party. But this argument presumed wrongdoing by the petitioner
and ignored the fact that there were already criminal statutes existing
punishing such behavior. As the attorney for Mr. X wrote after the case,
upon "confirming his HIV positive status he himself withdrew from the
marriage. " ' 17
The Court's opinion was also inconsistent in terms of the references it
made to American law. To bolster its argument that the rights of privacy and
confidentiality are not absolute, the Court cited several important US court
decisions, including quoting a passage from Roe v. Wade." 8 But the Court's
114. For two of the most informative websites that have volumes of medical studies on HIV/
AIDS, see http/www.iaen.org and http/www.unaids.org.
115. Id.
116. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (111),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. (Resolutions, pt. 1), at 71, art. 16, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948),
reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 127 (Supp. 1949). International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, adopted 19 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, art. 23, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23
Mar. 1976). These documents are also cited in Grover, Right to Marry, supra note 96.
117. Grover, Right to Marry, supra note 96.
118. Mr. X v. Hospital Z, A.I.R 1999 S.C. 501, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The
Court also cites other US cases in making the point that while it believes that people with
HIV should not marry, such individuals still have the right to work and enjoy government
services. The Court cites: Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 107 S.Ct. 1123
(1987); Chalk v. U.S.D.C. C.D. Ca., 840 F. 2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988); Shuttleworth v.
Broward County, 639 F.Supp. 654 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Raytheon v. Fair Employment and
Housing Commission, Estate of Chadbourne, 261 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1989).
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references to US case law were clear examples of selective citation. Missing
from its analysis was a discussion of how no state in the US denies people
the right to marry on the basis of HIV status. During the 1980s, over half of
the American states contemplated requiring couples to submit to pre-marital
HIV testing.11 9 All but two states (Illinois and Louisiana) rejected the idea,
and even these two states later repealed their laws.120 The states concluded
that such testing was excessively expensive, targeted a low risk population,
and came too close to breaching rights of confidentiality and privacy.12 1 Yet
the Indian Supreme Court ignored these relevant points when rendering its
decision.
There were related issues that the Court failed to consider. What if Ms.
Y had consented to marrying Mr. X after learning of his condition? Is it not
possible that a loving couple would still want to proceed with marriage
even where one of the parties is ill? Would we say to a couple that they
could not marry if the man was diagnosed with cancer? What about Article
21 of the Indian Constitution? It provides every individual with the
fundamental rights of life and liberty. 22 Why should an informed couple
lose the right to choose their destinies because one of them has HIV?123
This debate over "who can marry" is also of great significance in the
United States. While the issue in the American context focuses not on
people with HIV but rather on those who are gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgendered (GLBT), there are noticeable parallels. In the United States
the right to marry is only guaranteed for heterosexual couples of age. Almost
uniformly, American courts have held that same-sex couples do not "fit
within the traditional biblical and procreative goals of marriage." 24 Simi-
larly, in barring people with HIV from marrying, the Supreme Court of India
premised its argument on the belief that such a union interferes with a
couple's ability to live a "healthy" and "moral" life together.12 As the Court
put it:
119. Matthew Coles, Mandatory Pre-Marital HIV Testing: A Record of Failure, American Civil
Liberties Union AIDS Project (March 1988), available at http://www.aclu.org; see also
MICHAEL CLOSEN, AIDS: CASES AND MATERIALS (1995); Michael Closen et al., Mandatory
Premarital HIV Testing: Political Explosion of the AIDS Epidemic, 69 TUL. L. REV. 71
(1994).
120. Coles, supra note 119. Texas and Missouri had what was called conditional pre-marital
screening laws, but later Texas repealed its statute, and Missouri's law has not been
enforced.
121. Id.
122. INDIA CONST. art. 21 (1950).
123. These are many of the questions raised by Grover and others who have viewed this
decision skeptically. See Grover, Right to Marry, supra note 96.
124. WILUAM ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 9 (2002).
125. The penultimate paragraph of the Court's opinion uses these words repeatedly. See Mr.
X v. Hospital Z, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 503.
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Marriage is the sacred union, legally permissible, of two healthy bodies of
opposite sexes. It has to be a mental, psychological, and physical union. When
two souls thus unite, a new soul comes into existence. That is how the life goes
on and on on this planet.126
While both legal systems have restricted who may marry, the American
GLBT movement has exhibited more energy and activism in the pursuit of
this cause than the HIV movement in India. William Eskridge recently traced
the development of the GLBT litigation campaign. This activism emerged on
the heels of the civil rights movement and sought to make claims both on
equal protection and due process grounds. In its initial stages, the GLBT
efforts to marry were unsuccessful in court. Because judges did not view
same-sex marriage as a fundamental right, they "dared not accept these
[constitutionally-based] arguments in the 1970s. "1127 However as times
changed and the GLBT movement "lowered their sights" 128 progress did
occur. Domestic partnerships among same-sex couples started gaining
acceptance in certain cities. A Hawaii court ruled that the state had to show
a compelling interest for why same-sex couples could not marry. 29 And in
1 999, a Vermont court held that the state constitution guaranteed same-sex
couples the common protections and benefits of marriage that are provided
to heterosexual couples.' 30
By contrast, the HIV movement in India has not exhibited the same type
of energized legal mobilization regarding this issue of marriage. Several
explanations account for this lack of activism. For one thing, like most other
rights-based groups in India, HIV organizations struggle for resources. Their
infrastructure is weak and they have few secondary leaders or strong staff
support. While there are a handful of groups that focus on litigation, most
HIV organizations do not have lawyers or outside counsel ready to provide
able legal assistance. Moreover, the legal profession is too fragmented to
offer sustained assistance.1 31 Indian lawyers are typically isolated from each
other, and usually they lack the skills to implement true social reform. As a
result, most Indian lawyers are unable to help rights groups achieve their
particular needs and demands.'32
The structure of the Indian courts also has hindered the legal mobiliza-
tion of the HIV movement. As mentioned earlier, the Indian courts are
126. Id. at 502.
127. ESKRIDGE, supra note 124, at 9.
128. Id. at 12.
129. The Hawaii case was Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P2d. 44 (Haw. 1993). Although for a detailed
critique of this case, see ESKRIDGE, supra note 124, at ch. 1.
130. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). For a discussion of how same-sex unions are
treated in other nations, see ESKRIDGE, supra note 124, at ch. 3.
131. See Galanter, New Patterns, supra note 19, at 279-95.
132. Id. See also GALANTER, COMPETING EQUALITIES, supra note 10.
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clogged. Although many assume that such a backlog reflects a very litigious
Indian society,133 in reality, it is not that the courts are constantly receiving
petitions from anxious litigants, but rather that so few cases are resolved by
the legal system. 134 Outdated procedural laws that allow for endless
interlocutory appeals result in massive delays in judgments and contribute
to the vast number of undecided cases .13  Lawyers are paid per court
appearance and thus learn to manipulate the civil and criminal codes to
force cases to sit in the system for decades.1 36 Most social activists, including
those advocating on behalf of people with HIV, avoid a system that is
fraught with delay and operates at a glacial-like pace.13 7
133. This perception dates back to the time of the British. See e.g., Marc Galanter, The
Aborted Restoration of "Indigenous" Law in India, in LAW AND SOCIETy IN MODERN INDIA 38-
39 (Marc Galanter ed., 1989) [hereinafter Galanter, Aborted Restoration]. For a
contemporary example, see M. Jagannadha Rao, Need for More ADR Centres and
Training for Lawyers and Personnel, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: WHAT IT IS AND How
IT WORKS 103 (P.C. Rao & William Sheffield eds., 1997) (noting that "[I] ike the Americans
and others, we [Indians] too are a litigious society."); Neeta Sharma, A System that
Encourages People to be Litigious, HINDUSTAN TIMES, 5 July 2001 (on file with author).
134. For a detailed account of this point, see Galanter & Krishnan, Debased Informalism,
supra note 23. See also Christian Wollschlager, Exploring Global Landscapes of
Litigation Rates, in SOZIOLOGIE DES RECHTS: FESTSCHRIFT FUT ERHARD BLANKENBURG ZUM 60
GEBURTSTAG (Jurgen Brand and Dieter Strempel eds., 1998). Christian Wollschlager's thirty-
five country study of litigation rates between 1987 and 1996 notes that Indians ranked
among one of the world's lowest (thirty-second), with an annual per capita rate of 3.5
filings per 1000 persons compared to Germany which had a per capita rate of 123 filings
per 1000 persons and Sweden which had a per capita rate of 111 filings per 1000
persons. It is important to note that because no national data is available, Wollschllager
relied on statistics from the state of Maharashtra. Admittedly, Maharashtra has a
comparatively lower population of adults than other countries in Wollschlager's study,
and several matters that are brought to various tribunals in the state were not included in
the data collection. But there is no reason to think that Maharashtra is glaringly
unrepresentative of India as a whole. Although not without its weaknesses the Asian
Development Bank conducted a six-country study of Asian countries and found India's
rate of litigation ranks near the bottom. See KATHERINA PISTOR & PHILIP A. WELLONS ET AL., THE
ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIA ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1960-1995 (1999). See also
Robert Moog, Indian Litigiousness and the Litigation Explosion, 33 ASIAN SURV. 1136,
1138-39 (1993). Moog has data showing that in one of India's most populous states,
Uttar Pradesh, litigation rates have declined over a thirty-year period. There is a
limitation to Moog's study in that his data goes from 1951 to 1976; after this year the
state of U.P. stopped keeping such records.
135. Id.
136. See Galanter, New Patterns, supra note 19; see also R. Dev Raj, India: Consumer Courts
Slow Down, INTER-PRESS ERV. 20 Oct. 2000, available at http/www.oneworld.org/ips2/
oct/india/html (noting that "civil litigation [is] delayed indefinitely thanks to backlogs and
to smart lawyers who wear out litigants through adjournments."). Although just recently
the Indian parliament passed a new civil procedure bill that is intended to reduce delays;
time will only tell how effective this legislation will be. But see Barry Bearak, In India,
The Wheels of Justice Hardly Move, N.Y. TIMES, 1 June 2000, at Al (documenting how a
relatively simple property law dispute between two neighbors that began in 1961, ended
only after thirty-nine years of prolonged litigation-long after both parties were dead!).
137. For work that has looked at this issue empirically, see Galanter & Krishnan, Debased
Informalism, supra note 23; Epp, supra note 13; Galanter, New Patterns, supra note 19.
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A third factor impeding legal activism among the HIV sector over this
issue of marriage relates to the traditional mores prevalent within Indian
society. For centuries, hierarchy and caste dominated the social, political,
and economic relationships among Indians. The purity, impurity, and
untouchability of an individual correlated with where one stood in the caste
order. 3 While today untouchability is constitutionally impermissible, caste
continues to play a role in how the state crafts certain public policy
decisions.13 9 Caste is still an identifying characteristic among communities
within civil society, as well.1 40 With such a system in place, those with HIV
neatly fill a role that was reserved for people once also believed to be sick,
unclean, and beyond redemption. These societal shackles inhibit people
with HIV from mobilizing and place limitations on how they express
themselves.
Whether the HIV movement in India will ever fight for the right to marry
like GLBT activists have in the United States remains to be seen. Two
noteworthy developments occurred, however, soon after the Supreme Court
decided the Hospital Z case. The organization Lawyers Collective, brought
a case on behalf of four people affected by HIV in the Bombay High Court.
Two of the petitioners with the virus wished to marry one another. 14 The
Lawyers Collective asked the Bombay High Court to set forth the exact
parameters of the Supreme Court's decision in the Hospital Z case.1 42
(Interestingly, filing an "intervener," or friend of the court petition, was
Flavia Agnus, a long-time women's rights activist who argued that for the
protection of poorer, oppressed women, the Hospital Z decision should be
upheld).143 The Bombay High Court referred this matter to the Supreme
138. For a classic, but oft-criticized, work on caste see Louis DUMONT, HOMo-HIERARCHUS (1966).
An equally classic work that provides wonderful background on this matter is M.N.
SRINIVAS, CASTE IN MODERN INDIA (1962).
139. For the classic work that tackles this issue from a legal perspective, see GALANTER,
COMPETING EQUALITIES, supra note 10.
140. Actually it is one's jati, or sub-caste, that really is used as an identifying characteristic.
Caste, or what is sometimes referred to as "varna," is more of a general classification. For
a rich, more modern "subaltern" literature on this subject, see PARTHA CHATERJEE, THE
NATION AND ITS FRAGMENTS: COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL HISTORIES (1993); Gyandera Pandy,
Voices from the Edge: The Struggle to Write Subaltern Histories, 60 ETHNOS 223 (1995);
Sajal Nag, Peasant and the Raj: Study of a Subaltern Movement in Assam (1893-1894),
2 NORTH-EAT Q. 24-36 (1984); Elazar Barkan, Post-anti-colonial histories: Representing
the Other in Imperial Britain., 33 J. BRIT. STUD. 180 (1994); Dipesh Chakrabarty, Minority
Histories, Subaltern Pasts, 33 ECON. & POL. WKLY., 28 Feb. 1998, at 473; Ayesha Jalal,
Secularists, Subalterns and the Stigma of "Communalism": Partition Historiography
Revisited, 30 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 681 (1996).
141. See A, C & Others v. Union of India, Writ Petition No. 1322 (1999), Bombay High Court.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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Court, where at the time of this writing, the case is still pending.'44 As the
Lawyers Collective was filing this motion, a coalition of activists separately
petitioned the Supreme Court, also asking for clarification of the Hospital Z
case. Acting on this second petition, a three-judge panel in December 2002
stated that while the Hospital ZCourt correctly held that the privacy rights
of the doctor with HIV in that case were not violated, the rest of that
decision, including the section on marriage rights for people with HIV, was
"unnecessary" and "uncalled for."14s At least one prominent activist has
interpreted the language of this 2002 ruling "as restoring the right to marry
of an HIV positive person." 1 46 But it is important to note that the three-judge
panel did not explicitly overturn Hospital Z. Until such an affirmative
proclamation is made giving people with HIV the right to marry, doctrinally,
it remains unclear whether these individuals possess what ought to be their
fundamental right.
IV. CONCLUSION: ASSESSING THE
INDIAN JUDICIARY'S HIV JURISPRUDENCE
Conventional wisdom suggests that disadvantaged communities in India
have their constitutional rights best protected by using the tactic of public
interest litigation. The argument is that the constitution of India provides the
means for groups to have their voices heard and courts accordingly
safeguard their rights. This study has sought to challenge this argument on
-two different levels. First, a review of the literature indicates that there are
various institutional impediments that prevent claimants from effectively
using public interest litigation. Second, an in-depth analysis of the case law
involving one highly disadvantaged group, the HIV community, reveals that
the courts have been at best partially helpful.
For these individuals, a smattering of judgments has recognized the
importance of tackling the HIV/AIDS crisis in a direct, forthright manner. In
the Common Cause case, the Supreme Court of India exhibited significant
leadership when it ordered a total reform of how blood banks operate. In
ending the commercialization of blood donation, the Court sought to
protect those who might otherwise be exploited by unscrupulous vendors.
In different ways lower courts also have demonstrated a willingness to
144. The Bombay Court noted that another case very similar in nature is also in front of the
Supreme Court. See id (stating that "a person suffering from AIDS has moved the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, on the very same issues raised in this Petition ... .
145. Mr. "X" v. Hospital "Z" 2002 SCCL. COM 701.
146. Author Correspondence with Ketki Nagarkar, AIDS Unit Official, Lawyers Collective (15
Jan. 2003) (on file with author).
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address and safeguard the rights of people affected by HIV. In the MX case,
the Bombay High Court rejected the argument that HIV status alone could
disqualify an individual from employment. We also discussed how other
state High Courts have demanded that the government exhibit more public
openness in the way HIV policy is designed.
The success of these past public interest campaigns presumably has had
some impact on litigants who continue to bring HIV-related cases to court.
Consider that three different courts have issued orders prohibiting individu-
als from advertising and pedaling untested drugs that claim to cure AIDS.147
A Bombay High Court also just ordered the state of Maharashtra to pay for
all medical care for a 13-year-old girl who contracted HIV in a government-
run hospital.1 48 And in 2001, a High Court in the state of Andhra Pradesh
ruled that a patient who received HIV-tainted blood should obtain substan-
tial damages from a company that owned the hospital where the transfusion
occurred.1 49 In this particular case, the Andhra court, following the contours
of the Common Cause holding, directed the state to revamp its management
of HIV policy. Among its recommendations the court held that:
* blood banks should increase their standards for accepting donations;
* health care providers should undergo special training to deal with
HIV;
* the state should promote a large-scale public awareness campaign;
and
" hQspitals and health care facilities should adopt strict policies on
hygiene.15
0
147. These are, again, interim orders that have not been published. One of the interim orders,
issued 20 Apr. 2000 by the Bombay High Court, barred T.A. Masjid from selling
Ayurvedic, or homeopathic, drugs that he claimed cured AIDS. (Author correspondence
with officials at Lawyers Collective, 2 July 2002, on file with author.) The Supreme Court
in a dismissal order, reaffirmed the Bombay High Court ruling. See Supreme Court
Dismisses Majeed's Petition, Posting of sea-aids@healthdev.net, to sea-aids@lists.healthdev
.net (4 Apr. 2002) available at httpV/www.archives.hst.org.za/sea-aids/msgOO1 99.html.
Masjid was also barred from conducting his activities by the High Court in the state of
Kerala. See Press Release, Gov. India, Kerala High Court Bans Magic Drug: Court Order
to be Severe Deterrent for Quacks (22 Feb. 2002). For a case that allowed researchers to
continue with studies on Ayurvedic ways to combat AIDS, despite a claim by the plaintiff
that the defendants were stealing his ideas, see Jagdish Gandhi v. Satish B. Vaidya and
Others, 1999 Indlaw MUM 18 (holding that a court does not possess the tools for
deciding whether this alternative form of medicine can or cannot cure the recognized
public health calamity of AIDS, and that the evidence brought by the plaintiff was
insufficient to have the defendants' research stopped).
148. This unreported judgment is noted in, Maharashtra to Foot HIV Victim's Bill, INDIAN
EXPREss, 26 Apr. 2002, available at http://www.indian-express.com/full-story.php?
contentjid=1 658.
149. SMT M. Vijaya v. Singareni Collieries, A.I.R. 2001 A.P. 502. Note, the company also
happened to be the patient's employer.
150. Id. at 518-19.
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Most importantly, the court recommended that "efforts should be made
to supply anti-AIDS drugs free of cost... "151 While this landmark ruling is
on appeal to the Supreme Court, another recent case from Bombay that
reaffirmed the principle set forth in the MX case provides even more hope.
In Afcons Infrastructure v. Sonavane, the Bombay High Court ruled that any
employer making hiring decisions solely on the basis of an applicant's HIV
status exhibits "total ignorance about the condition of being HIV posi-
tive."" 2 As the court stated, such an "attitude [by the employer] is based on
a fear psychosis ... and has to be deprecated in very strong terms.""5 3
These cases show that courts are more open today when considering
the claims of people with HIV. But as we have also seen, this story is one
side of the coin. The Dominic D'Souza ruling is still valid. Even a generous
reading of the Supreme Court's 2002 decision cannot substantiate the claim
that the Hospital Z judgment is formally overruled. Judgments affirming the
mass arrests of suspected HIV carriers in Bombay and more recently in
Hyderabad' 4 illustrate that people with this virus do not receive full equal
treatment from the courts.15 - Since joining in 1995, India's membership in
the World Trade Organization (WTO) poses another concern. The WTO
requires all members to sign the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights
agreement (TRIPS). For India, this means that by 2005, the government will
have to abide by the agreement's strict patent protection procedures. This
raises the question of what will happen to patients presently receiving low-
priced AIDS medication from non-TRIPS compliant pharmaceutical compa-
nies. HIV-activists fear that once the agreement takes effect, the judiciary
will do little to ensure that the needs of these individuals are met.15 6
151. Id. 518. It is important to note that one of the first of these types of rulings in the world
came from the Supreme Court of Venezuela in 1999, which ruled that all anti retro-viral
HIV drugs be made free to patients who suffer from this virus. If the Supreme Court of
India does uphold this case, one question that arises is how exactly the government
would pay for this cost. Currently India devotes only .7 percent of its gross domestic
product to health care. An affirmation by the Supreme Court would force the government
to make very difficult economic and policy choices.
152. Afcons Infrastructure v. Babu (Bapu) Fakira Sonavane 2000 (4) Mh. L.J. 555.
153. Id.
154. See P.S. Swamy v. S.H.O. Hyderabad (1998) 1 Andh. LD 755.
155. Two state High Court cases that involve prisoners with advanced AIDS also highlight the
fact that these equal protection issues can sometimes be morally and legally difficult. In
both cases convicted felons who had committed brutal offenses sought release from
prison so that they could die in their home villages. In Surla Alias Sudalaimuthu v. State,
1997 Indlaw MAD 90, the Madras High Court refused to grant bail to two inmates who
were awaiting trial for throwing acid on a woman's face. Conversely in Vakil Chand v.
State, 1996 Indlaw PNH 51, the Punjab and Haryana High Court granted an early release
to an AIDS prisoner who was convicted of murdering a person during a robbery.
156. For information on this topic, see Richard Gerster, How WTO/TRIPS Threaten Indian
Pharmaceutical Industry, THIRD WORLD NETWORK, Aug-Sept. 2000, available at http:/
www.twnside.org.sg/title/twrl20h.htm. The website from the World Trade Organization
produces an immense amount of literature presenting its view, available at httpV/
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We see then that there are limited options for those who have HIV in
India. The findings from this study call into question whether using litigation
is the best way to remedy this hardship. Hopefully, future observers will
now investigate the type of relief courts have offered for other disadvan-
taged groups. Only after this process is completed will we know whether
the conventional wisdom that views the courts as the insurer of minority
rights is accurate.
No doubt some observers will contend that my measuring of success in
court, mainly in terms of whether a party "wins" or "loses," ignores other
factors behind why claimants litigate. In India, the political process is
viewed by much of the public as corrupt and inaccessible.'5 7 The courts-
at least the higher courts-routinely receive praise for their independence
and integrity."58 Going to court thus may provide a legitimate forum for
those seeking to advocate a cause when they might otherwise not have an
opportunity to do so.' Also there is evidence showing that when done in a
coordinated, structured, and repeated fashion, litigation has the potential for
creating a culture of rights-consciousness within a society. 60 And in
addition to winning, claimants may pursue litigation out of dedication to an
ideology or commitment to other partners within a policy network. 161
But even these studies recognize that there is considerable merit in
acquiring substantive legal rights from courts. Furthermore, because the
benefits from these alternative perspectives manifest over time, they amount
www.wto.org/english/tratop.e/trips.e/trips-e.htm. See generally Vandana Shiva, one of
the world's leading environmental and technology advocates and the chair of the
Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology, who offers a counter-
position, available at http/www.vshiva.net.
157. For a selected sample of readings on corruption in India, see generally VINOD PAVARALA,
INTERPRETING CORRUPTION: ELITE PERSPECTIVES INDIA (1996); U. Agarwal, Politics of Crime,
Corruption and Waste, Caste and Creed, 41 INDIAN J. PUB. ADMIN. 462-71 (1995); Robert
Wade, The System of Administrative and Political Corruption: Canal Irrigation in South
India, 18 J. DEV. STUD. 287 (1982); P.K. Doraiswamy, Tackling Corruption-Some
Relevant, Difficult Issues, THE HINDU, 5 Aug. 1997, at 25. Col. a.
158. Accounts of the higher judiciary's prominence within Indian society are well noted. For
a select set of readings, see Epp, supra note 13, at 71-89; Marc Galanter, Fifty Years On,
in SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE 57 (B.N. Kirpal et al. eds., 2000); Dhavan, Law as Struggle,
supra note 8; Baar, supra note 8.
159. For scholars who make this point in other contexts, see MICHAEL MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK:
PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994); JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978); STUART
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS (1974); KAREN O'CONNOR, WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS' USE OF
COURTS (1980).
160. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REV. 201 (1974); Epp, supra note 13.
161. Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 106; Krishnan & den Dulk, supra note 13; Jayanth K.
Krishnan, Perceptions and Interpretations of Law from Past to Present in the Subconti-
nent, GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 639 (2002).
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to little more than cold comfort for those who need help immediately. Delay
is endemic within the Indian judiciary, a fact that effectively forecloses using
litigation to gain quick payoffs. The courts also follow the principle of
precedent in an ad hoc manner, which adds angst to an already desperate
community.162 Having to choose between a political process that is flawed
and a judicial system that is inconsistent, time-consuming, and haltingly
helpful amounts to little choice at all. Until serious political reform is
undertaken or there is a reevaluation of the benefits courts provide, people
such as those with HIV will continue to serve as the newest class of
untouchables within Indian society.
162. Regarding this point on precedent, in the important Hospital Z, right to marry case,
consider that the Supreme Court did not cite one previous HIV judgment. One can make
the argument that the lack of citation does not necessarily mean that past cases played no
role in the Court's opinion. For a discussion of this point see NEIL DUXBURY, JURISTS AND
JUDGES: AN ESSAY ON INFLUENCE (2001). But Duxbury's argument also rests on what the
cultural norms are of a particular judiciary-i.e. where there is a culture of not citing
works, then citation should not be used as a measure. In India courts cite precedent all
the time. Here, although an elliptical reference is made to the MX case, the fact that the
Supreme Court omitted any direct citation of previous HIV rulings, I would argue is a
telling point in its own right.
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